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Casenote

Federal Rule 50: Medium Rare Application?
Unitherm Food Systems, Inc.
v. Swift-Eckrich, Inc.

I.

INTRODUCTION

The year 2006 marked a historical year for the now seventy-year-old
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50.1 In addition to an overhaul of the
statutory language, which, absent contrary congressional action, became
codified December 1, 2006, the Supreme Court issued its landmark
opinion in Unitherm Food Systems, Inc. v. Swift-Eckrich, Inc.2 In what
seems to be a straightforward procedural dictate from the High Court,
Unitherm has actually resulted in confusion among federal circuits
anxious to follow its precedent.
II.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The crux of the underlying dispute in Unitherm Food Systems, Inc. v.
Swift-Eckrich, Inc.' began as a patent infringement claim in which

1.
2.
3.

FED. R. Civ. P. 50.
126 S. Ct. 980 (2006).
126 S. Ct. 980 (2006).
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ConAgra, a subsidiary of Swift-Eckrich, Inc., sought to enforce its patent
entitled "A Method for Browning Precooked Whole Muscle Meat
Products," U.S. Patent No. 5,952,027 ("'027 patent").4 After issuance of
the patent, ConAgra issued a warning to competitors who sold equipment and processes pertaining to the same browning process, stating
that it intended to "'aggressively protect all of [its] rights under the
['027] patent.'" 5 Although competitor Unitherm did not receive the
warning, Jennie-O, another competitor using the same browning method,
did receive the warning. Jennie-O had purchased its method-the same
as ConAgra's-from Unitherm some years earlier, and Jennie-O began
an investigation to determine its rights and responsibilities with respect
to the '027 patent. Subsequently, Jennie-O determined that the '027
patent was likely invalid because Unitherm's president had invented the
process described by ConAgra's patent six years before ConAgra filed the
'027 patent application.'
After the discovery of the anticipatory browning process, Jennie-O and
Unitherm jointly sued ConAgra in the Western District of Oklahoma
seeking a declaratory judgment that the '027 patent was invalid.7 In
addition, Jennie-O and Unitherm also alleged that ConAgra had violated
section 2 of the Sherman Act' by attempting to enforce a patent that
obtained by defrauding the Patent and Trademark Office
had been
9
("PTO").
The district court held that the '027 patent was invalid based on
Unitherm's prior public use and sale of the patented method. The
district court also dismissed Jennie-O's antitrust claim due to a lack of
standing but permitted Unitherm's Sherman Act claim to proceed.' °
The case went to trial, and prior to its submission to the jury,
ConAgra moved for a directed verdict under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 50(a) based on the legal insufficiency of the evidence
presented. The court denied the motion, and the jury returned a verdict
for Unitherm. ConAgra did not renew its motion for judgment as a
matter of law under Federal Rule 50(b), nor did it move for a new trial
under Federal Rule 59."

4. Id. at 983.
5. Id. (alterations in original).
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. See 15 U.S.C. §.2 (2000 & Supp. 2004).
9. Unitherm, 126 S. Ct. at 983-84.
10. Id. at 984.
11. Id. Though ConAgra did file a motion after the verdict seeking a new trial on
damages, that motion did not include review of the sufficiency of the evidence in the
antitrust claim. Id. at 984 n.2. The Supreme Court held that such a motion for damage
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ConAgra then appealed to the Federal Circuit, again asserting
insufficiency of the evidence to sustain the antitrust jury verdict in favor
of Unitherm. 2 Applying the law of the Tenth Circuit, the Federal
Circuit relied on Cummings v. General Motors Corp.'3 and reviewed the
sufficiency of the evidence claim, even though ConAgra had not renewed
its motion postverdict as required by Rule 50(b)."4 Applying Cummings, the court held that the district court's review had been proper,
though the only available relief it could have awarded ConAgra was a
new trial. 5
In its review of the sufficiency claim, the Federal Circuit concluded
that although sufficient evidence existed to sustain the jury's verdict
that ConAgra's patent had been obtained through fraud on the PTO,
Unitherm "had failed to present evidence sufficient to support the
remaining elements of its antitrust claim.""6 As a result, the court
vacated the jury's judgment in favor of Unitherm and remanded for a
new trial. 7 On application by Unitherm, the Supreme Court granted
certiorari and reversed the Federal Circuit's grant of a new trial."8
III.

A.

LEGAL BACKGROUND

Statutory Background

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50" was originally enacted by
Congress in 1937.20 The first amendments of note to the debated
provisions (subdivisions (a) and (b)) occurred in 1963. Those amendments clarified that "[a] motion for judgment notwithstanding the
verdict will not lie unless it was preceded by a motion for a directed
verdict made at the close of all the evidence." 2' In addition, the time
limit for making the postverdict motion for judgment notwithstanding
the verdict ("j.n.o.v.") was set at "10 days after the entry of judgment,
rather than 10 days after the reception of the verdict," in an attempt to

review did not suffice for requesting review of the adverse verdict. Id.
12. Id. at 984.
13. 365 F.3d 944 (10th Cir. 2004).
14. Unitherm, 126 S. Ct. at 984.
15. Id. (citing Cummings, 365 F.3d at 950-51).
16. Id. Specifically, the Federal Circuit held that "'Unitherm failed to present any
economic evidence capable of sustaining its asserted relevant antitrust market, and little
to support any other aspect of its Section 2 claim.'" Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 984-85.
19. FED. R. CIV. P. 50.
20. See FED. R. Civ. P. 50 advisory committee's notes.
21. FED. R. CIv. P. 50 advisory committee's note (1963 amendment).
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maintain consistency with the time limit for requesting a Rule 59(b)
order 2for
a new trial and a Rule 52(b) motion to amend findings by the
2
court.

The substance of the subdivisions at issue has remained largely
unaltered since that time.2" Thus, at the time of the Unitherm trial,
the Supreme Court analyzed both the amended Rule 50 provisions in
tandem with several of its earlier opinions interpreting the operation of
subdivisions (a) and (b) on postverdict j.n.o.v. motions.'
HistoricallySignificant Case Law

B.

Promptly after its adoption, challenges to Federal Rule 50 arose in two
landmark Supreme Court decisions. In the first, Cone v. West Virginia
Pulp & Paper Co., 25 the Supreme Court held that when the party
seeking reversal of the judgment fails to move for j.n.o.v., "the appellate
to enter judgment
court [is] without power to direct the District Court
26
contrary to the one it had permitted to stand."
Cone was an action for damages for trespass to real property. At the
close of the evidence, the respondent moved for a directed verdict on the
ground that the petitioner had failed to adduce sufficient evidence that
he either owned or was in possession of the land at issue. The district
court denied this motion, and the jury returned a verdict for the
petitioner. The respondent then moved for a new trial on the basis of
newly discovered evidence but failed to renew his preverdict motion by
moving for aj.n.o.v. The district court also denied the motion requesting
a new trial.2 7
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that the
admission of certain evidence was prejudicial error and, without this
evidence, the petitioner had insufficient evidence to submit to the jury
the issues of title and possession. 2' Even though there had been no
postverdict motion for j.n.o.v., the circuit court reversed and directed
that judgment be entered for the respondent, rather than remanding the

22. Id.
23. See FED. R. CIrv. P. 50 advisory committee's notes. Technical amendments were
made in 1987 and 1993. Id. (1987 and 1993 amendments). Amendments in 1991 and 1995
sought to clarify the text of subdivisions (a) and (b) but had no effect on their application.
FED. R. Cirv. P. 50 advisory committee's notes (1991 and 1995 amendments).
24. See generally Unitherm Food Sys., Inc. v. Swift-Eckrich, Inc., 126 S. Ct. 980 (2006).
25. 330 U.S. 212 (1947).
26. Id. at 217-18.

27.
28.

Id. at 213-14.
Id. at 214.
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case to the district court for a new trial based on the newly discovered
evidence.29
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and held that the party's failure
to renew a Rule 50(b) motion postverdict precluded an appellate court
from directing entry of an adverse judgment. 0 The Court explained
that Rule 50(b) allows a trial judge the opportunity to order either a new
trial or a j.n.o.v because a trial judge "can exercise this discretion with
a fresh personal knowledge of the issues involved, the kind of evidence
given, and the impression made by witnesses."31 Further, the rule
allows a trial judge a "last chance to correct his own errors without
delay, expense, or other hardships of an appeal."32
That same year, the Supreme Court heard a case with a similar legal
issue in a slightly different procedural posture. In Globe Liquor Co. v.
San Roman,3 a breach of warranty action in the sale of certain liquors,
each party moved for a directed verdict at the close of evidence. Unlike
Cone, the petitioner's motion was granted, and a verdict and judgment
were returned and entered in the petitioner's favor. The respondents
moved for a new trial on the ground that there were contested issues of
fact that should have been submitted to the jury, but they did not move
for a judgment postverdict under Rule 50(b).3
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals set aside the judgment for the
petitioner and remanded the case to the district court with instructions
to enter judgment for the respondent.3 5 Affirming Cone, the Supreme
Court held that there was no pertinent procedural difference introduced
by the fact that the petitioner had originally prevailed upon a directed
verdict rather than a jury verdict.3 " Accordingly, the respondent's
failure to assert a Rule 50(b) motion made the circuit court's remand and
instruction improper.37
Four years later, in Johnson v. New York, N.H., & H.R. Co., 8 the
Supreme Court further defined the requirements of moving for a j.n.o.v.
pursuant to Rule 50(b), emphasizing, in part, specificity in motion
drafting.39 In a wrongful death suit against a New York railroad

29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Id.
Id. at 215, 218.
Id. at 215-16.
Id. at 216.
332 U.S. 571 (1948).
Id. at 572.
Id.
Id. at 573.
Id. at 574.
344 U.S. 48 (1952).
Id. at 50.
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company, the defendant railroad moved to dismiss the complaint and
requested a directed verdict at the close of evidence. The trial court
reserved its decision on the motion and submitted the case to the jury.
A verdict in favor of the petitioner was rendered and subsequently
entered. Within ten days, the railroad moved to have the verdict set
aside on the ground that it was excessive and contrary to both the law
and the evidence. The motion was subsequently denied; in the same
ruling, the court also denied the reserved preverdict motions for
dismissal and a directed verdict.'
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the motion
for a directed verdict should have been granted. Both parties agreed
that the reversal required the district court to enter judgment for the
railroad notwithstanding the verdict, thus depriving the petitioner of a
new trial. Accordingly, the court rendered judgment for the railroad
even though the railroad had not made a postverdict motion requesting
that relief.41
In its review of the case, the Supreme Court noted that "[alithough
this respondent made several motions it did not as the rule requires
move within ten days after verdict 'to have judgment entered in
accordance with his (its) motion for a directed verdict.' 42 The respondent's brief asserted that the motion to set aside the verdict was
"'intended to be a motion for judgment in its favor or for a new trial' and
that '[o]bviously respondent did not merely want the verdict to be set
aside but wanted ... a judgment in its favor or a new trial.' 3

Rejecting this argument, the Court noted that the "defect in this
argument is that respondent's motions cannot be measured by its
unexpressed intention or wants."" Treating the motion as it was
stated on its face-as one to set aside the verdict, rather than for a
j.n.o.v. (i.e., one to turn the verdict-loser into the verdict-winner)-the
Supreme Court emphasized that the requirement for a motion is "an
essential part of the rule, firmly grounded in principles of fairness. " '
As a result, the Court held that the failure to file the proper Rule 50(b)
motion deprived the appellate court of the power to order the entry of
judgment.4"

40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

Id. at 49.
Id. at 49-50.
Id. at 50.
Id. at 50-51.
Id. at 51.
Id. at 53.
Id. at 54.
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While each of the prior cases seemed to interpret Rule 50 using largely
the same analysis, the landscape of Rule 50 motions was changed
substantially some years later by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in
Cummings v. General Motors Corp.47 In Cummings injured motorists
brought suit against General Motors ("GM") to recover for injuries they
sustained in a GM vehicle that allegedly resulted from a defective seat
belt system.48 After the evidence was heard, both parties moved for
judgment as a matter of law, and the district court denied both motions.
The jury returned a verdict in favor of GM, but the plaintiffs did not
make any motions following the verdict. Instead, the plaintiffs appealed,
asserting that the court abused its discretion when handling specific
discovery matters and that the court should 49have directed a verdict in
their favor based on the evidence of liability.
Noting that the plaintiffs had properly moved for a Rule 50(a) directed
verdict (but only with regard to the defense of misuse and not with
regard to GM's general liability), the Tenth Circuit rejected GM's
argument that the plaintiffs had waived their right to a directed verdict
by failing to renew their motion postverdict pursuant to Rule 50(b). s°
The court of appeals held that "[w]hile true in most circuits, under Tenth
Circuit precedent, even where a party fails to make a post-verdict motion
...
it is not barred from appealing the issue of sufficiency of the
evidence" where a preverdict motion had been made.51
However, the court held that in the absence of a postverdict motion,
relief was limited to the grant of a new trial.52 Interpreting Cone,
Johnson, and Globe Liquor as applying only to entry of an adverse
judgment by the appellate court (in effect making the verdict-winner into
the verdict-loser), the Tenth Circuit held that the grant of a new trial
was a permissible remedy even though a timely Rule 50(b) motion had
not been made.53 Nonetheless, the court concluded that sufficient
evidence existed for the matter to go to the jury and refused to grant a
new trial.54 While Cummings was binding authority in the Tenth

47. 365 F.3d 944 (2004).
48. Id. at 946.
49. Id. at 947-48.
50. Id. at 949-50.
51. Id. at 950.
52. Id. at 951.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 951-52. With respect to whether the district court should have granted the
plaintiffs' motion for judgment as a matter of law as to the issue of GM's general liability,
the Tenth Circuit observed that the standard of review for the sufficiency of the evidence
on this issue was "plain error constituting a miscarriage of justice" because the plaintiffs'
Rule 50(a) motion was "limited to the issue of GM's misuse defense." Id. at 951. The court
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Circuit for two years, the Supreme Court's opinion in Unitherm
represents an express abrogation of the Tenth Circuit's holding.5 5
IV.

THE COURT'S RATIONALE

In Unitherm Food Systems, Inc. v. Swift-Eckrich, Inc.,56 Justice
Thomas, writing for a 7-2 majority, began by noting that the purpose of
Federal Rule 50"7 was to guide the procedural requirements for
challenging the sufficiency of the evidence in a civil jury trial and
established two times at which such a challenge may occur: "[1] prior to
the submission of the case to the jury, and [2] after the verdict and entry
of judgment." 8 Summarizing seminal cases in the history of Rule 50
jurisprudence, the majority reiterated the necessity of renewing a
postverdict motion pursuant to Rule 50(b), as established in Cone, Globe,
and Johnson.5 9
The Court explained that a postverdict motion was necessary because
"'[d]etermination of whether a new trial should be granted or a judgment
entered under Rule 50(b) calls for the judgment in the first instance of
the judge who saw and heard the witnesses and has the feel of the case
which no appellate printed transcript can impart.'" ° Additionally, the
"'requirement of a timely application for judgment after verdict... is
... an essential part of the rule, firmly grounded in principles of
fairness."'61
First, the Court was not persuaded by respondent ConAgra's assertion
that Cone, Globe, and Johnson were limited to whether an appellate
court could enter judgment for the verdict-loser in the absence of a
postverdict motion, and those cases did not prevent an appellate court
from ordering a new trial.6 2 Calling ConAgra's proposed distinction
"immaterial," the majority emphasized the practicality of allowing the
original district court judge to hear the initial motion and the equitable
nature of such a bright-line procedural rule." The Court emphasized
its holding in Johnson, which affirmed Cone and Globe Liquor, and

of appeals concluded that nothing in the record indicated "such a miscarriage of justice"
and held that the district court did not commit plain error by submitting the plaintiffs'
products liability claims to the jury. Id.
55. Unitherm, 126 S. Ct. at 988.
56. 126 S. Ct. 980 (2006).
57. FED. R. CIrv. P. 50.
58. Unitherm, 126 S.Ct. at 985.

59. Id. at 985-86.
60. Id. (quoting Cone v. W. Va. Pulp & Paper Co., 330 U.S. 212, 216 (1947)).
61. Id. at 986 (quoting Johnson v. N.Y., N.H. & H.R. Co., 344 U.S. 48, 53 (1952)).

62. Id.
63. Id.
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stated that "'in the absence of a motion for judgment notwithstanding
the verdict made in the trial court within ten days after reception of a
verdict [Rule 50] forbids the trial judge or an appellate court to enter
such judgment."' 4 The Court further rejected this argument by noting
that in Cone, Globe, and Johnson, the appellants moved for a new trial
but "did not seek to establish their entitlement to a new trial solely on
the basis of a denied Rule 50(a) motion. " "5
Next, the Court emphasized the asserted basis of the respondent's
appeal-the district court's denial of the respondent's preverdict Rule
50(a) motion-as a factor in its holding.6 6 Again relying on Cone, Globe
Liquor, and Johnson, the Court emphasized that the respondent did not
seek to "pursue on appeal the precise claim it raised in its Rule 50(a)
motion before the District Court-namely, its entitlement to judgment
as a matter of law," but instead sought a new trial based on the legal
insufficiency of the evidence.6 7 Emphasizing the text of Rule 50, which
"provides that a district court may only order a new trial on the basis of
issues raised in a preverdict Rule 50(a) motion when 'ruling on a
renewed motion' under Rule 50(b)," the Court reasoned:

[f as in Cone, Globe Liquor,and Johnson, a litigant that has failed to
file a Rule 50(b) motion is foreclosed from seeking the relief it sought
in its Rule 50(a) motion... then surely respondent is foreclosed from
seeking a new trial, relief it did not and could not seek in its preverdict
motion."
Again viewing the text of the statute, the Court noted that the
language of Rule 50(a)-"'the court may determine' that 'there is no
legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find for [a]
party on [a given] issue,' and 'may grant a motion for judgment as a
matter of law against that party.. .'7-supported the conclusion that on
appeal the respondent could not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence
based on the district court's denial of its Rule 50(a) motion.69 Such a

64. Id. at 986 n.4 (quoting Johnson, 344 U.S. at 50 (alteration in original)). Part of the
Court's emphasis on Johnson countered the dissent's position that federal statute 28 U.S.C
§ 2106, enacted after Cone and Globe Liquor, allowed the appellate court wholesale review
of the judgment without a Rule 50(b) renewal motion. Id. Noting that Johnson had been
decided after enactment of § 2106, the majority foreclosed the possibility that it affected
the procedural requirements of Rule 50(a) and (b). Id. The majority also expressed some
concern that such a wholesale review would implicate the Seventh Amendment's right to
a jury trial. Id.
65. Id. at 987.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 987-88.
68. Id. at 988.
69. Id. (alterations in original).
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determination, the Court noted, was within the district court's discretion
and promotes judicial economy by allowing the same judge to hear a
postverdict motion.7 °
Summing up a valuable lesson the Court
concluded: "The only error here was
counsel's failure to file a postverdict
71
motion pursuant to Rule 50(b)."
A.

Justice Stevens's Dissent

Justice Stevens's -dissent, which was joined by Justice Kennedy, took
a more equitable view of the application of Rule 50. Noting that "[e]ven
an expert will occasionally blunder," the dissenting opinion pointed to
Congress's decision to "preserve[] the federal appeals courts' power to
correct plain error, even though trial counsel's omission will ordinarily
give rise to a binding waiver" under 28 U.S.C. § 2106.72 Section 2106,
in part, gives the "Supreme Court or any other court of appellate
jurisdiction" the ability to "affirm, modify, vacate, set aside or reverse
any judgment, decree, or order of a court lawfully brought before it for
review .... ."
The dissent noted that "[n]othing in Rule 50(b) limits
this statutory grant of power to appellate courts; while a party's failure
to make a Rule 50(b) motion precludes the districtcourt from directing
a verdict in that party's favor ... ."' The dissent opined that arguments raised for the first time on appeal (and absent a Rule 50 motion)
"may be entertained ... if their consideration would prevent manifest
injustice.
In conclusion, the dissent emphasized that while Cone stands for the
proposition that "it may be unfair or even an abuse of discretion for a
court of appeals to direct a verdict in favor of a party that lost below"
when a Rule 50(b) motion was not made or to order a new trial when a
Rule 59 motion was not timely made, the courts of appeals do not "lack
'power' to review the sufficiency of the evidence and order appropriate
relief under these circumstances."76

70. See id. at 988-89.
71. Id. at 989. The Court was also not persuaded by the respondent's argument that
it relied on the Tenth Circuit's opinion in Cummings when it failed to renew its motion
pursuant to Rule 50(b). Id. at 989 n.6. The Court held, 'Ir]espondent cannot credibly
maintain that it wanted the Court of Appeals to order a new trial as opposed to entering
judgment." Id. Furthermore, because "respondent could not obtain the entry ofjudgment
unless it complied with Rule 50(b)," respondent had "every incentive to comply with that
Rule's requirements." Id.
72. Id. at 989 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); 28 U.S.C. § 2106 (2000).
73. Unitherm, 126 S. Ct. at 989-90 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2106).
74. Id. at 990.
75. Id.
76. Id.
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V. IMPLICATIONS
77
While on its face Unitherm Food Systems, Inc. v. Swift-Eckrich, Inc.

seems to stand for the simple propositions of effective motion practice by
counsel and a strict textualist interpretation of a Federal Rule, the
Court's decision has created a bit of a procedural morass that federal
courts eager to follow its holding must wade through. In the barely
eight months since the Supreme Court issued its decisions, federal courts
have grappled with defining the exact parameters set by Unitherm when
assessing Rule 50(a) and (b) procedural questions.
For example, in May 2006, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit performed an in-depth examination of the Unitherm
decision in Fuesting v. Zimmer, Inc. II ("Fuesting I").7'

Noting the

"subtle tension between the ability of the appellate court to engage in
harmless error analysis and the court's responsibility not to weigh the
sufficiency of the evidence in the absence of a properly filed postverdict
motion," the Seventh Circuit observed what is, perhaps, an inherent
ambiguity in the Supreme Court's ruling.79
In Fuesting II, an injured patient sought to recover damages for strict
products liability and negligence against an orthopaedic implant
manufacturer. Before trial, Zimmer, Inc. ("Zimmer") moved in limine to
exclude certain expert testimony, but the motion was denied.80 At the
end of the evidence, Zimmer moved for a judgment as a matter of law.
The district court denied the motion, and the case was submitted to the
jury. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Fuesting, and though the
court granted an extension of time for Zimmer to file postverdict
motions, Zimmer failed to renew its Rule 50(a) motion. Zimmer
subsequently appealed, alleging it was entitled to a new trial because of
the error in admitting the expert testimony and because of erroneous
jury instructions. 1

In Fuesting v. Zimmer, Inc. I, ("Fuesting P'), 8 2 decided before Uni-

therm, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that the expert
testimony was scientifically unreliable and its admission was error.83

77. 126 S. Ct. 980 (2006).
78. 448 F.3d 936 (7th Cir. 2006).
79. Id. at 939.
80. Id. at 937-38. Fuesting's experts offered opinions on Zimmer's causation of
Fuesting's injuries, specifically that the air sterilization method used by Zimmer caused
Fuesting's injuries. Id.
81. Id. at 938.
82. 421 F.3d 528 (7th Cir. 2005).
83. Id. at 536-37.

1080

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58

After viewing the remainder of the evidence, the court held that there
was insufficient evidence to sustain the verdict in favor of Fuesting and
reversed and remanded to the district court with instructions to enter
judgment for Zimmer."4 In the meantime, the Supreme Court decided
Unitherm, which made the actions of the Seventh Circuit (by turning
Zimmer, the verdict-loser, into the verdict-winner) improper."
In rehearing Fuesting I, the Seventh Circuit considered what relief
a court of appeals has the power to award "where there was prejudicial
evidentiary error in the district court." 8 Because the Supreme Court
indicated in Unitherm that "a court of appeals may not award judgment
due to insufficiency of the evidence where no Rule 50(b) motion was filed
after the verdict," the Seventh Circuit vacated its instruction to the
district court to enter judgment for Zimmer. 7 Assessing its review of
the admissibility of the expert testimony, the court concluded that
"weighing the value of Fuesting's remaining evidence after excising [the
expert's] testimony crossed the line into activity proscribed by Unitherm." " The court further noted that "Unitherm suggests that it will
usually be inappropriate for a court of appeals to award judgment in the
absence of a properly filed Rule 50(b) motion," but the Supreme Court's
holding "does not foreclose the ability of the appellate court to order a
new trial where evidence was improperly admitted."89 As the Court in
Unitherm specifically addressed the situation in which a litigant sought
a new trial on the basis of insufficiency of the evidence, the Seventh
Circuit emphasized that the "Court did not hold that a court of appeals
may not award a new trial on the basis of an erroneous evidentiary
decision. " "
The Seventh Circuit reasoned that the potential for confusion exists
because "Unitherm includes some strong language regarding the
necessity of postverdict motions" that arguably limits "a party's ability
to challenge any legal error where it failed to file a postverdict motion."9 The Seventh Circuit further elaborated:

84. Id. at 536-38.
85. See Unitherm, 126 S. Ct. at 988-89. Subsequently, Fuesting filed a petition for
rehearing, and the Seventh Circuit stayed consideration of the petition because the
Supreme Court had granted certiorari in Unitherm. Fuesting II, 448 F.3d at 937.
86. Fuesting II, 448 F.3d at 937.
87. Id. at 938.
88. Id. at 939.

89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. The Seventh Circuit points to the following sentence in Unitherm: "Accordingly, these outcomes merely underscore our holding today-a party is not entitled to pursue
a new trial on appeal unless that party makes an appropriate postverdict motion in the
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The potential for confusion in the context of evidentiary challenges
exists because, as discussed above, the prejudice analysis in appellate
review of evidentiary decisions involves what might be considered an
implicit weighing of the sufficiency of the evidence. An appellate court
cannot truly determine whether an error was harmless without
considering the force of other evidence presented to the jury.92
Despite this confusion, the Seventh Circuit held that the ability of a
court of appeals to award a new trial "where there is prejudicial
93
evidentiary error is well-established and undisturbed by Unitherm."
94
Reconciling Unitherm with Federal Rule of Evidence 103, the court
noted that "a party is not required to renew an objection to an evidentiary motion in order to preserve its right to appeal.""5 The court reasoned that "h]ad the Supreme Court intended to create such a broad
rule we presume the Court would have done so explicitly, addressing
Rule 103 as well as... cases in which courts of appeals have awarded
new trials purely on the basis of evidentiary errors."96
An equally significant implication of Unitherm and Rule 50 are the
latest revisions to Rule 50(a) and (b), which became codified December
1, 2006. Intended to be a "stylistic" change only, the language of Rule
50(a) "has been amended as part of the general restyling of the Civil
Rules to make them more easily understood and to make style and
terminology consistent throughout the rules."97
Additionally, when
discussing textual changes to subdivision (b), the Advisory Committee
notes explain:
Rule 50(b) is amended to permit renewal of any Rule 50(a) motion for
judgment as a matter of law, deleting the requirement that a motion
be made at the close of all the evidence. Because the Rule 50(b) motion
is only a renewal of the preverdict motion, it can be granted only on
grounds advanced in the preverdict motion. The earlier motion informs
the opposing party of the challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence
and affords a clear opportunity to provide additional evidence that may
be available. The earlier motion also alerts the court to the opportunity to simplify the trial by resolving
some issues, or even all issues,
98
without submission to the jury.

district court." Id. (quoting Unitherm, 126 S. Ct. at 987-88).
92. Id. at 939-40.
93. Id. at 940.
94. FED. R. EviD. 103.
95. Fuesting 11, 448 F.3d at 940; see FED. R. EVID. 103(a).
96. Fuesting II, 448 F.3d at 940.
97. FED. R. CIrv. P. 50 advisory committee's note (2006 amendment).
98. Id.
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These changes, however, do not seem to affect the Court's holdings in
Unitherm and prior cases that require a postverdict motion pursuant to
Rule 50(b) after a contrary verdict. These amended provisions tend to
make more clear what must be included in such a follow-up motion,
though the requirement for the motion still remains.
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